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Liability in Mass Immunization Programs 
Nina S. Appel* 
In January and February of 1976, army personnel at Fort 
Dix, New Jersey, became ill with flu-like symptoms. When stud- 
ies showed a viral infection similar to the one responsible for the 
1918-1919 Swine Flu pandemic, President Ford (and others) 
urged the appropriation of emergency funds for a nationwide in- 
fluenza immunization program.' Congress hurriedly appropri- 
ated $135,064,000,' but problems developed almost immediately. 
One of the four manufacturers3 of the vaccine produced the 
wrong strain, and distribution was delayed. All four manufactur- 
ers raised liability insurance concerns and were unwilling to pro- 
vide any vaccine without adequate insurance coverage.' Concern 
arose that the mass-immunization program would not begin 
before the influenza season. 
A. The Congressional Response 
President Ford's active involvement as well as the publicity 
associated with the mysterious outbreak of Legionnaires' Disease 
in Philadelphia in July 1976, may have provided the needed 
stimulus for congressional action. The Swine Flu Act-rovided 
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law 
in Chicago. J.D., 1959, Columbia University. 
1. Several excellent articles deal with the Swine Flu Program of 1976, including 
Baynes, Liability for Vaccine Related Injuries: Public Health Considerations and Some 
Reflections on the Swine Flu Experience, 21 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 44 (1977); Franklin & 
Mais, Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons from the Polio and Flu 
Episodes, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 754 (1977); Note, Apportioning Liability in Mass InocuEa- 
tions: A Comparison of Two Views and a Look at the Future, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 239 (1977); Note, Mass Immunization Cases: Drug Manufacturers' Liability for 
Failure to Warn, 29 VAND. L. REV. 235 (1976). 
2. Act of April 15, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-266, 90 Stat. 363 (1976). 
3. The four manufacturers were Merrill-National Laboratories; Merck Sharpe & 
Dohrne; Parke, Davis & Co.; and Wyeth Laboratories. See Swine Flu Claims Pile U p  in 
Washington, BUSINESS WEEK, January 24, 1977, at 23-24. 
4. See N.Y. Times, July 31, 1976, a t  9, col. 6; 122 CONG. REC. 26,634 (1976). 
5. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976,42 U.S.C. 5 247bG)-(1) (1976). 
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the necessary assurance to the drug manufacturers by making 
lawsuits against the government the exclusive remedy for all ac- 
tions connected with the Swine Flu program. The Act was 
passed precipitously,6 but not without concern that it could cre- 
ate an undesirable precedent.' The United States accepted lia- 
bility "for personal injury or death arising out of the administra- 
tion of swine flu vaccine under the swine flu program and based 
upon the act or omission of a program participant in the same 
manner and to the same extent as the United States would be 
liable in any other action brought against it under [the Federal 
Tort Claims Act]? 
Although the government cannot be held strictly liable 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act: the flu statute contained an 
exception: the liability of the United States could "be based on 
any theory of liability that would govern an action against such 
program participant under the law of the place where the act or 
omission occurred, including negligence, strict liability in tort, 
and breach of warranty."1° "Program participant" was to mean 
the manufacturer or distributor of the vaccine, and the public or 
private agencies, organizations, and medical personnel who pro- 
vided swine flu inoculations without charge and in compliance 
with the informed consent form and procedures." The govern- 
ment also agreed not to invoke the "discretionary" act exemp- 
tion of the Federal Tort Claims Act? Furthermore, if the swine . 
flu action was brought within two years of the date of inocula- 
tion and was dismissed for failure to file an administrative claim, 
a plaintiff was given the longer of thirty days after dismissal or 
two years from the date the claim arose to file an administrative 
claim.lS The remedy against the United States was exclusive,14 
6. Indeed, one commentator has pointed out that the bill as stated in the Congres- 
sional Record is not the bill as stated in the United States Code Congressional and 
Administrative News. Congress may not have known what was actually being enacted. 
See Note, Apportioning Liability in Mass Inoculations: A Comparison of Two Views 
and a Look at the Future, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 239, 259 n.128. 
7. See 122 CONG. REC. 26,627 (1976). 
8. 42 U.S.C. 5 247b(k)(2)(A) (1976). 
9. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972). 
10. 42 U.S.C. 5 247b(k)(2)(A)(i) (1976). 
11. Id. 5 247b(k)(2)(B). 
12. Id. 5 247b(k)(2)(A)(ii). 
13. Id. $ 247b(k)(2)(A)(iii). See, e.g., Low v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 948 (E.D. 
Va. 1978) (administrative remedies must be exhausted in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 8 
2675 (1976)). 
14. 42 U.S.C. 5 247b(k)(3) (1976). 
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and the case was to be tried without a jury as under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act? Notwithstanding any provision of state law, 
the United States was entitled to indemnity against any pro- 
gram participant whose failure to carry out a contract with the 
government or whose negligence caused the injury." 
A key concern addressed in the Act was the development of 
"a written informed consent form" with accompanying proce- 
dures, to assure that the risks and benefits from the swine flu 
vaccine were fully explained to each individual to whom the vac- 
cine was to be administered?' The Secretary of Health, Educa- 
tion, and Welfare (HEW), in consultation with the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedi- 
cal and Behavioral Research, was directed to draft and imple- 
ment this form.18 Notably, the consent form that was developed 
did not specifically warn of the possibility of contracting Guil- 
1ainBarre disease, a neurological disorder.'@ After describing the 
influenza and the vaccine, the form included a paragraph enti- 
tled "Special Precautions," which stated: "as with any vaccine or 
drug, the possibility of a severe or potentially fatal reaction ex- 
ists. However, the flu vaccine has rarely been associated with se- 
vere or fatal reactions." The vaccinee, or his guardian, signed in 
two places to afErm that he had read the statement about swine 
flu and the special precaution. A second form indicating that le- 
gal remedies were available against the United States Govern- 
ment was also distributed.1° 
The Act required the Attorney General to defend all claims 
arising out of the swine flu program against federal government 
employees or program participants and their insurers." Upon 
certification of the Attorney General, the United States was to 
be substituted as party defendant and the action removed to the 
appropriate federal district court." However, a program partici- 
15. Id. fj 247b(k)(5)(A); 28 U.S.C. 8 2402 (1976). 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 247b(k)(7) (1976). 
17. Id. § 247bCj)(l)(F). 
18. Id. 
19. Guillain-Barre is a neurological syndrome marked by burning or tingling limbs, 
general muscular weakness, and sometimes paralysis or even death. See STEDMEN'S 
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1383 (23d ed. 1976). 
20. This form, entitled "Important Information from the U S .  Public Health Service 
about Swine Flu and Victoria Flu Vaccines," referred the vaccinee to the U.S. Public 
Health Services Claims Office in Rockville, Md., for further information. 
21. 42 U.S.C. 8 247b(k)(4) (1976). 
22. Id. § 247b(k)(5)(A)-(B). 
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pant could lose its protected status if it failed to cooperate with 
the government in processing or defending a claim. If this oc- 
curred, the court was required to substitute that party as defen- 
dant in place of the United States, and upon motion, remand 
any such suit to the court in which it was instituted.13 Of course, 
status as a program participant required that the public or pri- 
vate agency or health personnel provide the inoculation without 
charge and in compliance with the informed consent 
pr~cedures.~' 
B. The Guillain-Barre Litigation 
Public concern about the safety of the vaccine and skepti- 
cism of the need for the program plagued the mass immuniza- 
tion efforts. After reports of suspected association between the 
swine flu vaccine and Guillian-Barre syndrome, the program was 
halted in December 1976. Under the provisions of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, as incorporated in the Swine Flu Act, a claim 
had to be filed within two years after accrual.26 For nearly all 
claimants the accrual date would be the date of inoculation or 
shortly thereafter; hence, the filing deadline for most claimants 
would have been within a short period after December 1978.16 
As of December 1979 a total of 912 suits had been filed 
against the United States for $1,150,000,000 in damages." Of 
these suits, 814 have been consolidated for pretrial procedure in 
the District of C o l ~ m b i a . ~ ~  Four hundred and ninety-four of the 
claimants allege Guillian-Barre syndrome, 121 allege other neu- 
rological disorders, and 252 claim nonneurological disorders. 
Forty-five deaths are alleged to have occurred as a result of 
Guillian-Barre. As of December 1, 1979, 3,813 administrative 
claims had been filed for a total of $3,417,000,000 in damages. Of 
these claims, 118 have been paid (settlements totalled $3.7 mil- 
lion), 1,580 have been denied, and 102 have been closed (with- 
drawn or abandoned by the claimant).'@ 
23. Id.  § 247b(k)(6). 
24. Id.  5 247b(k)(2)(B). 
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976). 
26. The program was resumed in February 1977 on a limited basis following an out- 
break of A-Victoria flu in Florida. 
27. Statistics obtained in a telephone conversation with Ms. Janice McLeod, parale- 
gal specialist, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Torts Branch (December 4, 1979). 
28. Id. See In re Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab. Litigation, 446 F. Supp. 244 
(J.P.M.D.L. 1978). 
29. Information supplied by Ms. McLeod, supra note 27. The statistics are not pub- 
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On June 16, 1978, HEW Secretary Califano announced that 
claimants for federal compensation would "not need to prove 
negligence by Federal workers or others in the Swine Flu pro- 
gram as required by Federal law and the law in many state~.'''~ 
Most claimants could therefore recover by showing that they de- 
veloped Guillain-Barre as a result of the vaccination and that 
they consequently suffered the alleged damages. The Secretary 
adopted the policy for two related reasons. The first was that 
the consent form had neither warned individuals that there was 
a "one in one hundred thousand" risk that a person would con- 
tract Guillain-Barre, nor that "one in every two million" would 
die from the condition." The second was that the federal gov- 
ernment, in an unprecedented effort, had actively urged Ameri- 
cans to be vaccinated." The Secretary emphasized, however, 
that this policy did not apply to any non-Guillain-Barre cases 
arising under the swine flu program, or to claims arising under 
any other government sponsored* or supported immunization 
C. Scope of Government and Manufacturer Liability 
To date, constitutional attacks on the Swine Flu Act have 
been made in four reported cases? The statute has been at- 
tacked as being violative of due process, equal protection of the 
laws, the seventh amendment right to trial by jury, and the 
tenth amendment reservation of power to the states. Neverthe- 
less, the constitutionality of the Act has been upheld in all the 
cases. 
Before enactment of the federal liability legislation, some 
states, led by California, had adopted legislation exempting par- 
ticipants (licensed health professionals or facilities) from liabil- 
lished but are available upon request. 
30. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, HEW News 2 (June 20, 1978). 
31. The Secretary observed that the lack of warning was probably defensible as a 
matter of law, since there was no evidence linking flu vaccinations to Guillain-Barre 
when the form was developed. Id. a t  3. 
32. Id. a t  4. 
33. Id. a t  2. 
34. See Ducharme v. Merrill-Nat'l Laboratories, Inc., 574 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1978); Jones v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. 
Ark.), a f d ,  583 F.2d 1070 (8th Cir. 1978); Wolfe v. Merrill-Nat'l Laboratories, Inc., 433 
F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Tenn. 1977); Sparks v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 411 
(W.D. Okla. 1977). 
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ity unless their behavior involved "willful miscond~ct ."~~ In a re- 
cent swine flu case, the California statute was upheld despite 
claims that it involved special legislation, fostered economic dis- 
crimination, and violated the supremacy clause.36 When the fed- 
eral legislation assumed its present form, the federal government 
was to be liable only if a private person "would be liable to the 
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act 
or omission occurred."s7 Therefore, in states like California, 
those injured by negligence during the administration of the 
program may receive no compensation. 
Claims brought directly against the vaccine's manufacturers 
have been similarly unavailing. An argument made in such ef- 
forts to sue the manufacturers directly is that the signing of an 
informed consent form is a sine qua non of the Act's operation. 
This, however, is troublesome in view of the fact that an esti- 
mated 13% of those vaccinated may never have signed any 
form." In a recent case,le the plaintiff, a doctor who had inocu- 
lated herself without signing the form, argued that because she 
had not signed the form her case fell outside the scope of the 
Act. The court refused to hold that drug manufacturers were re- 
quired to comply with the informed consent procedures before 
they could be considered program participants. In dictum, how- 
ever, the court stated that it  was "arguable" that program par- 
ticipant status might not be conferred on an inoculating agency 
or other health personnel absent such complian~e.~~ 
35. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 856.6 (West Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, 
4 12C (West 1971); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW $ 329 (McKinney 1971); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. 3 8334 (Purdon 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS 23-8-2 (Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE $ 44-29-210 
(Supp. 1979). 
36. Heitz v. County of Sacramento, 87 Cal. App. 3d 754, 151 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1978). 
37. 28 U.S.C. $ 1346(b) (1976). 
38. Note, Apportioning Liability in Mass Inoculations: A Comparison of Two 
Views and a Look at the Future, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 239, 253 n.85 (citing 
N.Y. Post, Dec. 18, 1976, at 3, col. 2 (final ed.)). 
39. Wolfe v. Merrill Nat'l Laboratories, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Tenn. 1977). 
40. Similar questions of program participant status could be raised if the vaccine 
had been sold, or if the program participant otherwise refused to cooperate with the 
government. Suppose, for example, that a negligent, insolvent doctor were to injure a 
vaccinee in a jurisdiction that did not exonerate program participants for negligence. If 
the doctor cooperated with the government, the Act's provisions would substitute the 
government as a defendant and presumably the plaintiff could recover. The government 
would then bear the risk of the doctor's insolvency in an indemnity claim. Could the 
same doctor, merely by refusing to cooperate with the government, force the plaintiff to 
sue him personally in a state court? This was surely not the intention of the Act, and 
equitable considerations might dissuade the government from so acting were the situa- 
tion to arise. 
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The full range of injuries to be compensated under the pro- 
visions of the Act remains undetermined. The language used by 
Congress is very broad, referring as it does to "personal injury or 
death arising out of the administration of swine flu vaccine 
under the swine flu program and based upon the act or omission 
of a program parti~ipant."~~ The Act further provides that "lia- 
bility" may be based on any theory "that would govern an action 
against such program participant under the law of the place 
where the act or omission occurred, including negligence, strict 
liability in tort, and breach of ~arranty. '"~ Injuries resulting 
from negligently broken or unsterilized injectors, or from negli- 
gently administered inoculations, would certainly be covered in 
those jurisdictions where negligence is actionable, but other situ- 
ations are less certain. For example, a pending case4' alleges that 
the plaintiff fainted while leaving the building in which she had 
received a swine flu vaccination. Her fall resulted in several 
chipped teeth. If she merely tripped over a step, or had fallen on 
her way into the building, her injury could arguably fit within 
the broad language of the Act. Another injury arguably within 
the scope of the Act is negligently inflicted emotional distress. 
Many jurisdictions recognize the tort, especially where the requi- 
site "impact" has been alleged. The inoculation itself would 
surely be sufficient impact. 
During the Senate debate on the proposed swine flu legisla- 
tion, many were made uneasy by the fact that the insurance 
companies viewed the risks of the program as being too great to 
insure against." A brief review of recent cases involving the lia- 
bility of drug manufacturers in regard to ethical drugs suggests 
that the concern was not unfounded. 
A. Drug Liability and the Duty to Warn 
A claimant in any product liability action usually has a 
41. 42 U.S.C. 5 247b(k)(2)(A) (1976). 
42. Id. 5 247b(k)(2)(A)(i). 
43. Childress v. United States, No. 1-77-313 (E.D. Tenn., transferred to the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, In re Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab. 
Litigation, 453 F. Supp. 648 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978)). 
44. 122 CONG. REC. 26,628 (1976) (Senator Taft referred to "only . . . two settle- 
ments of law suits arising out of neglect in the production of vaccine in the past 7 years 
. . . and only . . . 16 cases since 1920."). 
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choice of several legal theories. Depending on the law of the ju- 
risdiction and on the facts of the case, a plaintiff may proceed 
on theories of negligence, breach of warranty (implied or ex- 
press), strict liability in tort, or misrepresentation. Obviously, 
practical considerations regarding evidentiary matters, the rele- 
vant statute of limitations, available defenses, and the availabil- 
ity of punitive damages, may well make one theory preferable to 
another. But often, the pleadings are couched in the alternative. 
The claimant with a drug related injury is no different from 
other plaintiffs in that he must allege one of the above legal the- 
ories in order to be heard and must establish the elements of his 
case in order to prevail. To date, the concept of no-fault recov- 
ery for drug-induced injuries urged by several legal scholars, 
particularly in mass immunization cases:= has been resisted in 
this country. The courts have also been unwilling to hold manu- 
facturers "absolutely liable," rejecting the theory that the pro- 
duction of drugs is an ultrahazardous activity." 
The ethical-drug manufacturer has a duty to test and de- 
velop the drug properly,47 to comply with all government regula- 
t ion~:~ to keep abreast of developments in regard to the drug:@ 
and to warn of side effects-a troublesome responsibility in re- 
cent years. 
In the case of prescription drugs, a warning to the doctor is 
ordinarily held to satisfy the manufacturer's duty.60 For a breach 
45. See generally Baynes, supra note 1; Franklin & Mais, supra note 1, a t  773; Mc- 
Kean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U .  CHI. L. REV. 3 (1970); 
O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. 
REV. 749 (1973). 
46. See Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 47-48, 588 P.2d 326, 341-42 (1978) (refusing 
to impose absolute liability on the manufacturer of an investigational drug); McCreery v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 86, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 736 (1978). 
47. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973); Roginsky 
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, 
Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). 
48. Government regulations are beyond the scope of this paper. See generally 
McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974); Rheingold, 
The MERl29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. 
REV. 116 (1968). 
49. See, e.g., Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970); Ster- 
ling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 
286 (8th Cir. 1967); Mahr v. G. D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540, 390 N.E.2d 1214 
(1979); Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967). 
50. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); Sterling Drug, 
Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966); Love v. Wolf, 249 Cal. App. 2d 822, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 42 (1967); Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 
(1963); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 418, 307 A.2d 440 
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of that duty, the manufacturer is directly liable to the patient? 
It  has been said that the manufacturer's compliance with this 
duty enables the prescribing physician, the "learned intermedi- 
ary between the purchaser and the manufa~turer,"~ to balance 
the risk of possible harm against the benefits to be gained by the 
patient's use of the drug." The rationale is that if the doctor is 
properly warned "there is an excellent chance that injury to the 
patient can be avoided. This is particularly true if the injury 
takes place slowly . . . ."" The duty to warn the medical profes- 
sion is not measured in all cases by quantitative standards. In 
some circumstances, the manufacturer may have a duty to warn 
those few persons it knows will be injured by the drug's side ef- 
f e c t ~ . ~ ~  Furthermore, the warning has to be brought home to the 
doctorm undiluted by overpromotion of the drug.67 
A further controversial and unresolved question is whether 
a drug manufacturer may be held liable for failure to warn of 
unforeseeable risks, or whether its liability for failure to warn is 
limited to those risks which it knows or has reason to know are 
inherent in the use of its drug." In a recent case, Hamilton u. 
Hardy," the two theories were distinguished by the Colorado 
Court of Appeals. Finding error in the trial court's refusal to in- 
struct the jury on strict liability for the defendant doctor's fail- 
ure to warn concerning the dangers of Ovulen, the court re- 




51. See, e.g., Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970); 
McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974). 
52. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d at  85. 
53. See, e.g., McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. at 387, 528 P.2d at  
529. 
54. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d a t  85. 
55. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d at  430; Sterling Drug, Inc. v. 
Cornish, 370 F.2d a t  85. 
56. Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 
RUTGERS L. REV. 947, 993 (1964); Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th 
Cir. 1979); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969). 
57. See, e.g., Salmon v. Parke-Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975); Stevens v. 
Parke-Davis & Co., 9 Cai. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973); Love v. Wolf, 
249 Cal. App. 2d 882, 58 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1967); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 291, 282 
A.2d 206, 220 (1971). 
58. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d at  426; Parke-Davis & Co. v. 
Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969); Mahr v. G. D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d at  
560, 390 N.E.2d at  1220; Woodill v. Parke-Davis & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 353, 374 
N.E.2d 683,686 (1978); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. at 386,528 P.2d 
at  530. 
59. 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976). 
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same under both theor ie~,"~~ but refused to find the theories 
identical. 
Under strict liability, the test is whether the failure of Searle 
to adequately warn of the potentially dangerous propensities of 
its product rendered that product unreasonably dangerous. It 
is of no import whether the drug manufacturer's warning com- 
ported with the warning a reasonably prudeht drug manufac- 
turer would have given. "[Sltrict tort liability shifts the focus 
from the conduct of the manufacturer to the nature of the 
The court proposed the following test to determine whether the 
evidence submitted warranted a finding for the plaintiff: 
"A way to determine the dangerousness of the article, as dis- 
tinguished from the seller's culpability, is to assume the seller 
knew of the product's propensity to injure as it did, and then 
to ask whether, with such knowledge, he would have been [act- 
ing unreasonably] in selling it without a warning."82 
The opposing view was articulated clearly by the Michigan 
Supreme Court in the recent case of Smith v. E. R. Squibb & 
Sons, Inc." The plaintiffs deceased wife suffered a rare anaphy- 
lactic reaction when the defendant's product, Renografin-60, was 
injected into her blood stream. Breach of implied warranty and 
negligence were pleaded, but the trial court refused to instruct 
the jury regarding the warranty theory. The supreme court af- 
firmed, commenting: 
[Wlhen the factual issue is not whether the product itself is 
defective, but is whether the manufacturer has provided ade- 
quate warnings, the existence of a product defect and a breach 
of duty is determined by the same standard-reasonable care 
under the circumstances. . . . 
. . . Consequently, when liability turns on the adequacy of 
a warning, the issue is one of reasonable care, regardless of 
whether the theory pled is negligence, implied warranty or 
strict liability in tort? 
60. Id. at 383, 549 P.2d at 1106. 
61. Id. at 383-84,549 P.2d at 1107 (quoting 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY $ 16A[4][e] (1975)). See also Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 
S.W.L.J. 5 (1965). 
62. 37 Colo. App. at 385-86, 549 P.2d at 1108 (brackets in original) (quoting Phillips 
v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974)). 
63. 405 Mich. 79, 273 N.W.2d 476 (1979). 
64. Id. at 89-90, 273 N.W.2d at 480. 
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It has been held that the manufacturer's duty to warn the 
medical profession extends beyond the prescribing physi~ian .~~ 
In a case involving oral contraceptives, the Oregon Supreme 
Court stated: 
It is especially important that the treating doctor receive the 
manufacturer's warning where it is impossible to predict in ad- 
vance whether a particular patient is apt to suffer adverse ef- 
fects from a drug, since the treating doctor may be more likely 
to observe the actual symptoms of the drug's untoward 
consequences. . . . 
. . . The warning should be sufficient to apprise the gen- 
eral practitioner as well as the "unusually sophisticated medi- 
cal man" of the dangerous propensities of the drug.66 
B. The Polio Cases and the Duty to Warn 
Several recent cases involving polio vaccines have further 
delineated the drug manufacturer's duty to warn, and in so do- 
ing have greatly alarmed the drug industry. The original polio 
vaccine was the Salk vaccine (dead virus). Later the Sabin oral 
vaccine was developed, as types I, 11, and 111. The Sabin vaccine 
was licensed by the Division of Biologic Standards (DBS), which 
was then a part of HEW. In 1960 an advisory committee was 
established by the Surgeon General to review polio prevention. 
After a showing of some association between the type I11 Sabin 
polio vaccine and the development of polio in adults, the advi- 
sory committee recommended in 1962 that the vaccine's use be 
limited to children in nonepidemic situations. The committee 
further recommended that the type I11 vaccine only be used for 
adults with the full recognition of its minuscule risk (estimated 
to be about 7.6 per million for persons over twenty years of age). 
The manufacturers sold their vaccines to mass immunization 
clinics that were often established with the assistance of drug 
salesmen. In most instances, no warnings were given, and doc- 
tors did not individually evaluate a person's need for the drug. 
In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, I ~ C . , ~ '  the plaintiff con- 
tracted polio thirty days after receiving a type I11 Sabin vaccine 
65. See Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 141 (3d Cir. 1973); McEwen v. 
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 387-88, 528 P.2d 522, 528 (1974). 
66. McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. at 387-88, 528 P.2d at 529; see 
Mahr v. G. D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540,561-62,390 N.E.2d 1214, 1229-30 (1979). 
67. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968). See also Stahlheber v. American Cyanamid Co., 
451 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1970) (on causation and failure to warn in oral polio vaccine injury). 
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in a Montana clinic. A pharmacist had been delegated the task 
of administering the vaccine in the absence of a doctor. The 
court considered the manufacturer's alleged failure to warn the 
plaintiff of the risk as sufficient to expose it to strict liability in 
tort. Since the vaccine presented a known risk that could not be 
narrowly defined, it could be properly marketed only by "full 
disclosure of the existence and extent of the risk in~olved.""~ 
The court observed that the risk of the plaintiff contracting po- 
lio from the wild virus was about the same as the risk of con- 
tracting polio from the vaccine. Even though Wyeth had techni- 
cally warned the medical society, it failed in its responsibility 
since it knew that the drug was not dispensed as a "prescription 
drug" and that the warnings were not reaching the consumer. 
The court suggested means of communication the manufacturer 
could have undertaken, such as advertisements, posters, oral 
warnings, or releases to be read and signed by recipients of the 
vaccine. 
In Reyes u. Wyeth Laboratorie~,"~ an eight month-old child 
given trivalent vaccine at a health clinic in a rural Texas com- 
munity developed polio. The mother had been given no warnings 
by the registered nurse who administered the vaccine. Although 
the defendant contended that there was an epidemic of wild po- 
lio in the county at the time the child became ill, and that Sam- 
ples of the virus taken from the child upon admission to the hos- 
pital were "probably wild,"70 the jury found that the vaccine 
caused the child's polio. The court established two tests whereby 
a manufacturer would be liable: (1) whether the product was so 
unsafe that its marketing alone was "unreasonably dangerous 
per se," or (2) whether the product was marketed without suffi- 
cient safeguards and was therefore "unreasonably dangerous as 
marketed."71 Because of the legitimate public interest in 
preventing polio, marketing the vaccine was held to be justified. 
However, under the circumstances of the vaccine's administra- 
tion, where no individualized medical judgment intervened be- 
tween the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer, the manu- 
facturer was "required to warn the ultimate consumer, or to see 
that he [was] warned."7a The court postulated a rebuttable pre- 
68. 399 F.2d at 129. 
69. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974). 
70. Id. at 1271. 
71. Id. at 1273. 
72. Id. at 1276. 
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sumption "that the consumer would have read any warning pro- 
vided by the manufacturer, and acted so as to minimize the 
The fifteen year old patient in Cunningham v. Charles Pfi- 
zer & Co.?' was given the type I Sabin vaccine in a Tulsa, 
Oklahoma clinic and subsequently developed polio. The defen- 
dant claimed there was no evidence that the plaintiff would have 
refused to take the vaccine had the warnings been given to him 
or to his parents. The court held that the plaintiff was not re- 
quired to present any direct evidence on this point and was enti- 
tled to a rebuttable presumption. In view of the fact that there 
was considerable risk of contracting polio from natural sources 
at the time the vaccine was given (twelve cases of polio occurred 
in Tulsa during October and November 1962, two months before 
the plaintiffs inoculation), the court concluded that the issue of 
whether the plaintiff as a reasonably prudent person would have 
refused to take the vaccine had adequate warning been given 
was for the jury. 
In Givens v. Lederle,76 the plaintiffs young daughter was 
given an oral vaccine by her pediatrician. The mother, who had 
never received a polio vaccination of any kind, developed polio 
within nine days of her daughter's ingestion of the third dose of 
vaccine. On the insert packaged with the vaccine, the defendant 
Lederle had stated that: 
Para1yti.c disease . . . has been reported . . ., in some in- 
stances, in persons who were in close contact with subjects who 
had been given live oral polio virus vaccine. Fortunately, such 
occurrences are rare, and it could not be definitely established 
that any such case was due to the vaccine strain and was not 
coincidental with infection due to naturally occurring poliomy- 
elitis, or other entroviruse~.~~ 
Mrs. Givens had received no warnings from her pediatrician. At 
the first trial, the judge had kept the jury from hearing evidence 
on the issue of whether oral vaccine can cause polio. After the 
Reyes decision, the court reversed itself and granted the plain- 
tiffs motion for a new trial. In turn relying upon Reyes, the re- 
viewing court upheld the lower court's action, and stated that in 
73. Id. at 1281. 
74. 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974). 
75. 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977). 
76. Id. at 1343. 
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Reyes it was not a significant factual distinction that the vaccine 
had actually been ingested by the plaintiff, because the defen- 
dant's "warning" admitted that some persons in close contact 
with vaccinees had developed paralytic diseases. The only issue 
was whether polio could be transmitted to someone in close con- 
tact. Testimony showed that a mother changing her baby's 
diapers would be particularly susceptible to contracting the dis- 
ease. In addition, because administration of the vaccine by a pri- 
vate pediatrician rather than personnel in a county health clinic, 
was not "nearly so great" a difference as the defendant had ar- 
gued it to be, the manufacturer's duty to warn the patient ex- 
tended to this situation. The doctor testified that the vaccine 
had been administered in a manner more similar to procedures 
followed at a small health clinic than to normal procedures used 
in prescribing drugs. If this was true, then the defendant was 
responsible for taking definite steps to warn the consumer di- 
rectly. Even if the drug were considered a prescription drug, the 
court found that the enclosed warning did not adequately state 
the risk. The doctor testified that the manner of stating the one 
in three million risk was a "very nebulous way of putting it."77 
Thus, the drug manufacturers' duty to warn has been ex- 
tended beyond the prescribing physician to the entire medical 
community. How this warning is to be communicated to doctors 
specializing in different areas of medicine is not clear. Further- 
more, in the absence of a learned intermediary, the warning 
must be given to the patient himself, and sometimes even to a 
third party. In Givens a close relative was allegedly harmed, but 
the court did not limit its holding to close relatives. Therefore, 
the scope of the duty owed third persons remains unclear. It is 
also unclear how a proper warning is to be drafted when a man- 
ufacturer possesses incomplete information, but has some suspi- 
cion, based on a statistically small sample of reported cases, that 
its drug may cause adverse side effects. 
The fact that the drug package insert has been approved by 
the FDA does not relieve the drug manufacturer of its obligation 
to communicate an adequate warning to the users of the drug.78 
An Oregon case7@ indicating that a drug complying with FDA 
regulations was reasonably safe as a matter of law has been ex- 
77. Id. at 1345. 
78. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978). 
79. Lewis v. Baker, 243 Or. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966). 
691 MASS IMMUNIZATION LIABILITY 83 
. pressly overruled.80 The warnings required by such agencies may 
be only minimal,sl and therefore do not provide an adequate 
standard by which to measure a manufacturer's duty. 
C. The DES Cases and the Problem of Proving Causation 
There are other uncertainties peculiar to drug litigation. Be- 
cause of the lengthy time interval between ingestion of a drug 
and manifestation of the injury, and the even longer period be- 
tween the injury and the identification of the drug as its proba- 
ble cause, a plaintiff may have difficulty in identifying the drug's 
manufacturer. Nowhere is this problem evidenced more clearly 
than in the current DES l i t igat i~n?~ 
In 1941 the FDA approved DES after twelve drug com- 
panies filed new drug applications. In support of their request 
the companies submitted a joint clinical file. The purpose for 
which the drug was approved in 1941 did not include its subse- 
quent and popular use for the prevention of miscarriages. In 
1947 new applications for that use were submitted by the twelve 
companies and others, and from 1947 to 1971 the drug was man- 
ufactured by hundreds of drug companies and prescribed for 
millions of women. In 1971 statistical evidence indicated a sig- 
nificant association between DES and the development of cancer 
in the users'  daughter^:^ who had been exposed in utero. The 
FDA banned the drug in 1971 as unsafe and ineffective in 
preventing  miscarriage^.^' Although there were several hundred 
manufacturers of DES and related drugs, i t  was estimated that 
Eli Lilly and five or six other manufacturers accounted for 90% 
80. See McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 398,528 P.2d 522,534 
(1974). 
81. See, e.g., Salmon v. Parke-Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975); Stevens v. 
Parke-Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973). See also 21 
U.S.C. 5 355 (e)(l) (1976) (approval of new drug application may be withdrawn if clinical 
or other experience, tests or other scientific data show the drug to be unsafe); 21 C.F.R. 5 
310.300 (1979) (requires a manufacturer holding an approved new drug application to 
maintain records so that the FDA can determine whether there are grounds for suspen- 
sion or withdrawal); 21 U.S.C. 5 352(a) (1976) (a drug or devise is misbranded if its 
labeling is false or misleading in any way). 
82. DES is the acronym for diethylstilbestrol, a manmade estrogen. For a full dis- 
cussion of the problems faced by plaintiffs in DES actions, see Note, DES and a Pro- 
posed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978). 
83. In addition, a possible decrease in fertility has been noted in users' sons. 
84. The 1962 Amendment to the Food, Drug qnd Cosmetic Act required proof of 
effectiveness as well as safety. 21 U.S.C. 5 355 (1976). 
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of the market.8Wevertheless, it was extremely unlikely that any 
plaintiff would be able to trace back the particular DES taken 
by her mother to any one individual manufacturer. 
Prior tort cases provided some guidelines for the DES plain- 
tiffs. Hall u. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & C O . ~ ~  consolidated two 
cases arising out of eighteen separate accidents in which chil- 
dren were injured by dynamite blasting caps. The explosions de- 
stroyed the evidence of manufacture in most cases. The plain- 
tiffs joined the six major domestic manufacturers of blasting 
caps and their trade association, alleging that the defendants 
knew that the caps were dangerous and that they had agreed not 
to put warnings on them." The court held that the defendants 
were not entitled to a dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims since the 
plaintiffs were claiming joint control of risk by explicit agree- 
ment-i.e., concert of action.88 The court went on to add that 
the plaintiffs could either "submit evidence of defendants' paral- 
lel behavior sufficient to support an inference of tacit agree- 
ment,"89 or allege that, acting independently, the defendants 
had adhered to an industry-wide standard with regard to the 
safety of blasting caps? The court discussed enterprise liability 
and emphasized its special applicability to industries composed 
of a "small number of units."91 The burden of proving causation 
was shifted to the defendant? despite the possibility that the 
caps might have come from other unnamed sources. 
Another approach for DES plaintiffs is the "alternative lia- 
bility theory." In Summers v. Tice,*" the plaintiffs two compan- 
ions fired their guns simultaneously and carelessly in his direc- 
tion. Only one bullet actually hit the plaintiff, but it was 
impossible to prove which defendant had caused the injury. The 
court justified its concept of joint and several liability on the 
grounds that when all the defendants are potential wrongdoers, 
fairness requires a finding of joint liability unless the defendants 
can individually exonerate themselves. 
85. B. SEAMAN, WOMEN AND THE CRISIS IN SEX HORMONES 33 (1977). 
86. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
87. Id. at 359. 
88. Id. at 373-74. 
89. Id. at 374. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 378. 
92. Id. at 378-80. 
93. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). See also Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 
154 P.2d 687 (1944). 
691 MASS IMMUNIZATION LIABILITY 85 
In the related case of Anderson v. Somberg,@* the plaintiff 
was injured when part of a surgical instrument broke off in his 
spinal canal during an operation. He sued the doctor and hospi- 
tal for negligence, the distributor for breach of warranty, and 
the instrument's manufacturer in strict liability. The court held 
that because it was apparent that at least one of the defendants 
was liable for the plaintiffs injury, all were jointly liable unless 
proven otherwise. No other theory of liability could reasonably 
be applied. "Since defendants had engaged in conduct which ac- 
tivated legal obligations by each of them to plaintiff, . . . the 
failure of any defendant to prove his nonculpability would trig- 
ger liability; and further, . . . at  least one would be liable."" 
Plaintiffs have recently used analogous arguments-with va- 
rying degrees of success-jn attempting to trace liability back to 
the DES manufacturers. In McCreery u. Eli Lilly & C O . ; ~  the 
court refused to accept the "sketchy and limited factual circum- 
stances presented in [the plaintiffs] argument of concerted ac- 
tivity," and held that the plaintiff must, "before benefiting from 
the shift of the evidentiary burden, identify the manufac- 
turer."@' Since knowledge of the manufacturer was more accessi- 
ble to the plaintiff (whose mother had known of and possessed 
the prescription, and had chosen the doctor and druggist), the 
court affirmed the summary judgment for the defendant. A con- 
trary result was reached in Sindell u. Abbott Laboratories,B8 
where the plaintiffs alleged concerted action and theories of al- 
ternative liability. And in the much publicized New York case of 
Bichler u. Eli Lilly & Co.,@@ a jury awarded $500,000 to a twenty- 
five year old woman who developed vaginal and cervical cancer 
as a result of her mother's ingestion of DES. There the plaintiff 
alleged joint enterprise liability. This approach, if successful on 
appeal, is sure to have a major impact on the more than 400 
DES suits still pending. 
D. Application of Statutes of Limitation 
Since a plaintiff in a drug liability action may plead a vari- 
ety of legal theories-e.g., negligence, warranty, strict liability in 
94. 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975). 
95. 67 N.J. at 298, 338 A.2d at 4. 
96. 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978). 
97. Id. at 84-85, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 735. 
98. 85 Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1978). 
99. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1979, 5 3, at 11, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 16, 1979). 
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tort-it is necessary at the outset to determine which statute of 
limitations period applies to each cause of action pleaded. Typi- 
cally, the tort or personal injury limitation is two or three years 
and accrues at the time of injury. The warranty limitation under 
the Uniform Commercial Code is four yearslOO and accrues from 
the date the sales contract is breached. It is, of course, entirely 
possible that the limitation period for one cause of action will 
have expired while that of another remains viable.lol 
A second and far more complicated question is when the 
cause of action accrues. The Uniform Commercial Code provides 
that the "action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of 
the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach 
of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made . . . . ,,lo2 
Nonetheless, there are at least four points at which a tort cause 
of action may accrue: (1) when the defendant breaches his duty, 
(2) when the plaintiff suffers harm, (3) when the plaintiff is or 
should be aware of his injury, or (4) when the plaintiff is or 
should be aware of the causal relationship between his harm and 
the defendant's misconduct. In most tort actions these events 
occur simultaneously and the time of accrual is clear. But this is 
seldom the case in drug induced injuries. It is impossible to gen- 
eralize the law regarding statutory interpretation insofar as it af- 
fects drug litigation,loS except to point out that it is in a state of 
flux. 
Some jurisdictions, led by New York, have adopted the 
strict position that the cause of action accrues when there is a 
wrongful invasion of personal or property rights,lo4 regardless of 
whether the plaintiff realizes he has been injured. Most lower 
courts in New York have persisted in this "first breath" rule,lo5 
despite a more liberal approach to malpractice claims that in- 
100. U.C.C. § 2-725. 
101. See Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co., 57 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974), in which 
the court held that the two-year period for strict liability in tort had elapsed while the 
four-year statutory period for implied warranty had not. 
102. U.C.C. § 2-725(2). 
103. See Birnbaum, "First Breath's" Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule in Products 
Liability Cases, 13 FORUM 279 (1977); Note, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise 
Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 970 n.23; Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 821 (1965). 
104. See Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemical Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 
142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, amended, 12 N.Y.2d 1073, 190 N.E.2d 253, 239 N.Y.S.2d 896, 
cert. denied, 374 US. 808 (1963). 
105. So-called because the Schwartz plaintips injury for inhalation of dust accrued 
with his "first breath." See, e.g., Reis v. Pfizer, Inc., 61 App. Div. 2d 777, 402 N.Y.S. 2d 
401 (1978), aff'd, 48 N.Y.2d 664, 397 N.E.2d 390, 421 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1979). 
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volve the leaving of a foreign object in a patient's body-for 
which the statute does not begin to run until the patient could 
reasonably have discovered the injury106-and despite the more 
liberal tolling of the statute by the continued treatment by the 
physician.lo7 Recently, exceptions to these rules have been made 
in products liability cases brought for occupational disease in 
strict tort liability.lo8 It has also been held that the continuous 
treatment of an attending physician may be imputed to the 
manufacturer of a medical device, thus tolling the statutory pe- 
riod applicable to claims against the manufa~ tu re r .~~~  
Other jurisdictions have adopted the liberal discovery of in- 
jury rule. Yet even with these jurisdictions generalizations are 
dangerous. Clearly, the plaintiff may learn of his injury many 
years before he is able to identify its cause. Some courts have 
held that the statute begins to run at the time the plaintiff knew 
or should have known of his injury. Knowledge of injury is only 
apparent if the injury is a "traumatic" one.l1° However, if the 
plaintiff has not been made aware that his rights were violated, 
the modern trend and majority position in products liability ac- 
tions is that the plaintiffs action accrues when he discovers, or 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should discover, that his 
injury may have been caused by the defendant's conduct,ll1 
rather than when he simply discovers that he has been injured. 
On the issue of fairness to the drug companies, the New Hamp- 
shire Supreme Court has observed: 
With respect to their expectations of repose, drug companies 
are unique among most potential tortfeasors. The harmful 
propensities of drugs are often not fully known at the time the 
drugs are marketed. These companies know or at  least should 
expect that some time may pass before the harmful effects of 
106. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 
301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969). 
107. See N.Y. CN. PRAC. LAW § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). 
108. See, e.g., McKee v. Johns Manville Corp., 94 Misc. 2d 327, 404 N.Y.S.2d 814 
(Sup. Ct. 1978). 
109. See Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). 
110. Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974). But see 
Roper v. Merkle, 59 Ill. App. 3d 706, 375 N.E.2d 934 (1978). In this case Berry was 
restricted to traumatic injuries. In addition, the statute of limitations for medical mal- 
practice cases was held to begin to run when the plaintiff knows that he has a physical 
injury and that it may be the result of someone's negligence. 
111. See G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22,122 Cal. Rptr. 218 
(1975); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977); Gilbert v. Jones, 
523 S.W.2d 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974). 
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their products manifest themselves in drug users and that 
there may be another lapse of time before the injured person is 
able to discover the causal connection between his injury and 
the drug he consumed. . . . Given these unique circumstances 
and the fact that the scope of a drug manufacturer's liability is 
substantial and seems to expand continually through the 
growth of substantive tort and warranty doctrines, . . . we do 
not think the drug company can reasonably expect to be im- 
mune to suit before its customer has a fair opportunity to dis- 
cover the company's tortious conduct.lle 
E. The Recent DES Case of Mink v. University of Chicago 
A recent case, Mink v. University of Chicago,l13 posed many 
of the issues discussed in this article. There the plaintiffs 
brought a diversity action on behalf of themselves and some 
1,000 women who were given DES as part of an experimental 
study allegedly conducted by the named defendant and Eli Lilly 
& Co. They claimed that they and their children had suffered 
reproductive tract abnormalities and had incurred an increased 
risk of cancer. In their complaint they sought recovery on three 
causes of action. They first alleged battery, since the medical ex- 
periment was conducted without their knowledge or consent. 
The court distinguished this case from those in which the pa- 
tients at least knew that they were being given some form of a 
drug."' In those cases negligent failure to disclose risks had to 
be pleaded and proved, and injury had to be alleged. The gist of 
the battery claim was nonconsent-the tort being complete 
without hostile intent, and without personal injury. The issue of 
whether implied consent had been given was left to the jury. 
The second count was in strict liability and was dismissed be- 
cause the named plaintiffs had alleged no injury to themselves. 
In their amended complaint they sought damages for alleged in- 
jury to other class members, but this was held to be an insuffi- 
cient allegation of injury to the named plaintiffs.ll5 The third 
claim was that no effort had been made to notify the plaintiffs of 
their participation in the experiment until 1975 or 1976, even 
112. Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. at 173-74, 371 A.2d at 176 (citations 
omitted). 
113. 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
114. Id. at 717. 
115. 460 F. Supp. at 722-23 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 
U.S. 26 (1976)). 
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though the relationship between DES and cancer was known to 
the medical community as early as 1971. The court recognized a 
continuing duty to warn on the part of both the university and 
the drug manufacturer,l16 but dismissed this count for failure to 
state a cause of action. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs 
sought to compel the defendants to notify all the women given 
DES as part of the experiment. Since the plaintiffs' proposed 
class had never been certified, and since the named plaintiffs al- 
ready were aware of the DES menace, the plaintiffs could not 
show that there was an ongoing controversy at the time the com- 
plaint was filed. The named plaintiffs knew of the dangers and 
thus had no need for further notice.l17 
The concerns of the manufacturers and their insurers there- 
fore appear more understandable in the context of recent devel- 
opments in drug litigation. Despite the articulated concerns of 
Congress, it seems inevitable that future mass inoculation pro- 
grams will involve an attempt to have the government under- 
write the costs of liability. For this reason it is important to re- 
fer to the Federal Torts Claims Ad, and particularly to the 
"discretionary act" exception,l18 which has so often been in- 
voked by the government in avoiding liability. 
Two cases are particularly relevant in considering govern- 
mental liability for drug approval and distribution. In Griffin v. 
United States,ll@ the plaintiff allegedly contracted polio as a re- 
sult of ingesting the type I11 Sabin vaccine. She brought an ac- 
tion against the government claiming that the vaccine had been 
negligently tested by the Division of Biologic Standards (DBS) 
and had been approved for release in violation of agency stan- 
dards. Since the application and not the content of the agency 
rules was attacked, the court held that the discretionary func- 
tion exception did not apply. The court commented: 
"The "discretion" protected by the section is not that of the 
judge-a power to decide within the limits of positive rules of 
law subject to judicial review. It is the discretion of the execu- 
tive or the administrator to act according to one's judgment of 
116. Id. at 720. 
117. Id. at 723. 
118. 28 U.S.C. 5 2680(a) (1976). 
119. 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974). 
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the best course, a concept of substantial historical ancestry in 
American law. . . . Where there is room for policy judgment 
and decision, there is discretion."laO 
While DBS had the right to weigh five criteria of neurovirulence, , 
its judgment was that of a professional, not a policy maker. I t  
was purely a scientific determination since DBS's responsibility 
was limited to merely executing the policy judgments of the Sur- 
geon General. Furthermore, in approving this lot of vaccine, 
DBS had exceeded its authority by disregarding the mandatory 
regulatory command and had diluted the results of the tests per- 
formed by considering "biological variation." "The violation of a 
nondiscretionary command takes what otherwise might be char- 
acterized as a 'discretionary function' outside the scope of the 
statutory exception."lal 
However, in Gray v. United States12' the plaintiff was un- 
successful in her suit. She alleged that she had been injured 
when her mother ingested DES and sued both Eli Lilly and the 
federal government, relying on Griffin as precedent. Summary 
judgment was granted both defendants. The court commented 
that "[tlhe FDA was given a general statutory mandate to assure 
the public that a marketed drug [was] safe for use."12s There 
were no particular scientific tests or measuring sticks existing 
whereby the FDA had to qualify a new drug, but rather it was 
given the liberty to consider all factors it deemed relevant in the 
determination of a drug's safety. "Congress [had] chosen the 
FDA to be the decision maker, . . . and its judgments . . . must 
be beyond private scrutiny and litigation."la4 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Thus, a clear message emerges: in any future mass inocula- 
tion program, agency action must be "nondiscretionary" if the 
federal government is to be held liable. To the extent possible, 
specific "measuring sticks" or tests should be specified. In view 
of the strict liability claim frequently made in drug litigation, i t  
is likely that the government will be forced to concede liability 
120. Id. at 1064 (emphasis in original) (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 
15, 34-36 (1953)). 
121. Id. at 1068-69. 
122. 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978). 
123. Id. at 340. 
124. Id. 
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on that ground despite the present limitation on liabilit~."~ It is 
clear that the government must develop clear guidelines for pro- 
tecting participants in the mass immunization programs it 
deems necessary. In the absence of such protection, we may ex- 
pect continued resistance from drug manufacturers, health care 
providers, and their insurers to any participation in such 
programs. 
125. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972). 
